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In The Supreme Court
of th,e State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

ALBERT ALLAN MELTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

12149

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Albert Allan Melton, appeals
from a conviction of robbery rendered in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Albert Allan Melton, was found guilty
by a jury of the crime of robbery on April 23, 1970,
nnd was thereafter sentenced to be committed to the
l:tah State Prison on April 27, 1970, for the term pre1eriher1 by law.
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26, 1969 at about 7

.p.m. the attendant
at the . J3iostoh BuildiJ.ig;
-FJaq.k J
robbed by a
.. (:R. 84) Mr. Jamnik
testified that ·at a lineup on January 10, 1970, and at
the preliminary hearing he had-said he was "pretty sure"
I

that
giff, but he
was not "positive," not "100% sure." (R. 88-90). Mr.
J amnik identified appellant at trial as the one who
robbed
196i)(
James Tea testii'itci) ovb-1

of appellant

J
J
1
the
borrowed a:
gun .a,t aqout 5 :OO qr 6 :00 o
,p.m. and returned it
!'f: ·_,_·
that sam.e night
at .about
9;30
(R. 91, 92)
r • ': } ; .,
;i f; ;·)
admitted, however,· that he did not remember that it
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was.; June 2-.6, .·
.\Xher;i 1tWs
but that the
district attornefna'.cl 'told him thaf was tne date. (R. 92)
·Officer E1oyd; ·Ledforci. testitfied :that he and Officer Percy 1Clark ·arrested appellant .:dn January 2,
1970, .for armed robbery, and told· him :his rights under
the lUiraudfJ : decision. ;( R._ 95) He stated that in the
police car he showed appellant some handcuffs that
1

:
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were imolved in the robbery. Appellant objected> at
this point on

grounds that there was no showing of

a waiver of appellant's right.s. ·(R. 95, 96). Officer Led'

.

I

,

ford te&tified over objection that appellant said he had
some handc:uffs
he didn.'t.
if that pair. was.his.
He
.tJiat
said he understood his
rights, and that he wished to talk. However, when asked
about the robbery he had nothing to say. (R. 97) Appellant \Vas' taken to the Salt I,ake ·.rail Facility and
booked. bf'ficer Ledfbrd sfa1:ed that ·as :he and Officer
Clark were 'about to leave, appeflant called them back
and 'stated ;he, wanted 'to tam. (R. 97; 98) ·This is in
.conflict with' Officer Ledf6rd's prior testimony at the
Motiort 'tO' Suppress hearing where he did not mention
that
volunteered any; information. Appelfarit
was not readvised of his rights at this point in the jail,
but Offieer: Le:dford 'testified that he told appel1ant
that the same rights still applied. This also was not testi·fiett to at the
t6. St1ppress. Over objection, Ofificer 'Ledford sta.ted' 'that appellant told him and Offirer Clark 'that' bet was the -0ne who borrowed Tea's shotgun and· held up the Boston Building Garage on :June
2a; 1969. (R. 98;: 99) On cross examination Officer
Ledfbtd stated he· did :not threiten appellant, but told
him that he was a suspect in other cases. (R. 101) He
recall .whether or: nbt he told appellant these other
charges (including a Fede.ral charge) might be filed.
\R. IOZ) Appellant- was told about these other charges
I
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merely "to inform him that there were other cases
pending that he was a suspect." (R. 103) However,
Officer Ledford did admit that part of the purpose was
to induce a statement, but he said that was basically not
the reasons, ( R. 103, 104) because they (the police) felt
the case was solved, despite the fact that the victim
could not positively identify the defendant at that point
in time. (R. 104, 105).
At the Motion to Suppress (R. 49-74) which was
held prior to trial on March 23, 1970, appellant testi·
fied that on the date of his arrest, January 2, 1970,
Officers Ledford and Clark told him that if he did not
cooperate other charges would be filed against him
(R. 52, 53) and that they would try to see to it that
his parole was revoked and that they would check to
see if any other robberies could be pinned on him. (R.
55). He further testified that they did not readvise him
of his rights at the jail and that he didn't know from
the first warning whether he had to make a statement,
though he had understood the first warning. (R. 57)
He stated that they said he could fight the robbery from
prison because he would get his parole revoked, but
that if he cooperated they (the police) would see that
no hold was placed on him, ( R. 57) and he would be
back out of prison.
Officer Ledford denied making any threats or
promises at this hearing (R. 64-66) and at the trial. (R·
101) Officer Clark also testified that no threats or

1
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promises were made to get appellant to cooperate, but
that appellant was told about other charges that could
be filed merely to inform him of that fact. (R. 70, 72)
The trial court denied appellant's :Motion to Suppress the statements in question.
ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I
STATEl\IENTS l\IADE BY APPELLANT TO
POLICE OFFICERS vVERE rMPROPERL y
ADl\IITTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
ADEQUATE SHOWING BY THE STATE OF
AN INTELLIGENT AND KNOWING W AIVER BY APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTION AL RIGHTS.

1

Under ]}firanda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 692 ( 1966), it is clear that when
an accused is in custody he must be given certain warnings before he can be interrogated. There is no question
here but that appellant was in custody in that he was
under arrest. These rights can be waived, but Miranda
held that there is a heavy burden on the state to show
that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
counsel. 384 U.S. at 475. If an individual is alone and
indicates in any way that he does not wish to be interro-
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gated after he is warned, the police may not question
him. 384 U.S. at 445. This is based on the rationale of
trying to stop situations where an accused person says
"no" to attempts at questioning and the police refused
to accept "no" for an answer. United States v. Bird,
293 F. Supp. 1265 (D. l\:Iont., 1968). In Bird, the accused stated that he did not wish to discuss the matter
and then later made a statement. The court held that
where an accused first states that he does not want to
talk and then later makes a statement, the burden on
the state is greater to show a valid waiver.
In appellant's case, appellant indicated in the police
ear that he did. not have anything to say about the robbery, and that he understood his rights. (R. 97} Soon
thereafter in the jail appelhmt gave a statement to the
police officer. Appellant testified at the Motion to Sup·
press that this w:?s under threats and that he was not
readvised under Miranda. ( R. 52-55) Officer Ledford
testified at trial, but not at the Motion to Suppress,
that appellant volunteered this statement. (R. 97, 98)
He also testified that appellant 'Was not readvised of
his rights. (R. 101) Officer Clark testified at the Motion to: Suppress but not to the effect that appellant
volunteered any statements, but simply that no threats
-0r promises . were made. ( R. 70-72) .. Thus, there is
the :Statement of one officer, in which he neglected to
mention at the Motion to Suppress, that the statement
of appellant was v0lunteered. This was contradicted by

7

appellant and was not supported by the other police
officer who was present. The Court in Miranda stated
that a valid waiver will not be presumed from the
silence of the accused after he has been warned and
from the fact that a statement was eventually obtained.
384 U.S. at 475.
Thus appellant contends that since he refused to
talk about the charge to the police in their police car,
they were under a duty not to question him further and
that any statements resulting from such further questioning are inadmissable under llliranda. Further, the
state has not met the heavy burden it bears under
Miranda of showing that there was a valid waiver and
a volunteered statement by simply introducing the
contradicted and unsupported statement of one police
officer, whose testimony was inconsistent with his own
prior testimony on the same subject. Miranda held that
an accused's constitutional rights have been violated if
a conviction is based in whole or in part on an involun:
tary confession regardless of its truth or falsitY.,a.IJ.d
.
'
even if there is ample evidence aside from the confess.ion to support the convictions. See footnote 33, 384
U.S. at 464. Therefore appellant contends that he is
titled to a reversal of his
a n.ew trial.

POINT II.

' 1i .
, I

i:

:MADE BY .A.J>PELLAN'f 'l'O
POLICE OFFICERS WERE: IMP-ROJ?ERLY

8

ADl\IITTED BECAUSE THEY 'VERE NOT
l\IADE VOLUNTARILY BUT AS A RESULT
OF PROl\IISES AND THREATS THAT APPELLANT WOULD BE CHARGED 'VITH
OTHER CRil\IES .
.A.ppellant testified that he was threatened by
police officers that if he did not cooperate with them
they had other charges they could bring against him
and that they would see to it that his parole was revoked. ( R. 52, 53, 55) He also testified that promises
were made to him on the condition that he cooperated.
(R. 57) These threats and promises were denied by
the police officers, but both officers Ledford and Clark
testified that appellant \Vas told about the other charges
that could be brought (R. 70, 101, 102), merely to in·
form appellant of this fact. However, Officer Ledford did admit on cross-examination that even though
the basic purpose of telling appellant about these other
charges was not to induce him to make a statement,
"there was some inference to that." ( R. 104)
The law seems well settled that a confession is not
made involuntary only by the presence of the third degree or physical coercion. "Coercion that vitiates a confession ... can be mental as well as physical.... Subtle
pressure may be as telling as course or vulgar ones.···
"Garrity v. Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496, 87 S. Ct. 616.
17 L.Ed.2d 562 ( 1967) . The basic standard of whether

9

a confession is voluntary or not is well summarized in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 795, 9
L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). The Court said there that if the
"... individual's 'will is overborn' or the confession not
the 'product of rational intellect and free wil,' " the
confession will be inadmissable because coerced. Significantly it is also there stated, 372 U.S. at 307, that
"these standards are applicable whether a confession is
the product of physical intimidation or psychological
pressure.... "
The United States Supreme Court has further
laid out what constitutes a voluntary confession. To be
admissable a confession must be " ... freely and voluntarily given: that is, must not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
any improper influence." (emphasis added) Brady v.
United States, 897 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25
L.Ed.2d 7 47 ( 1970) . From this language it is clear
that speculation as to the amount of pressure exerted
will be largely useless as even "implied promises, however slight" and "any sort" of threat will invalidate
the confession.
A case similar to appellant's is People v. Boles, 221
Cal. App.2d 455, 34 Cal. Rptr. 528 ( 1963). There a
conviction of receiving stolen property was reversed because a confession admitted at trial was held not voluntary. The police officer in Boles told the defendant at

10

the police station that he wanted to get tC> the bottom
of the thing, and that he was going to charge defendant
with burglary. The defendant said that he was not involved in the burglary. The offieer told him that he
would not charge him if he was not involved and if he
told what he knew about ·the case._ The resulting statement was held to be coerced and so invalidated the confession.
In appellant's case, taking the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, the officers did not state
that appellant Would be: charged if he didn't cooperate
or that he would not be charged if he did cooperate.
However, if one is told that there could be charges filed
against him, the- obvious ·inference· is that the charges
will be· brought· if he fails to cooperate and they
not be brought if he cooperates. It strains the reality of
the situation)to- believe that police office:Ps tell an accused person ilbout. other cases that could be brought
against him. merely to ·inform him of this fact sa he
wilt be aware of it. They are under no duty to so in·
form. -

a

\Vhere: defendant is told that other charges could
be filed against him while in a jail setting, while' an investitTation
of a· robberv
is being made and while the
b
•
victim states he is unable to positively identify the per·
petretor of the crime and a confession is clearly needed
to solve the case, the conduct by the police officers
would clearly fit into the Brady ti. United States, supra,
;

1
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category of "implied promise, however slight" in that
it was at least an implied promise that if cooperation
were forthcoming, other charges would not be filed.
This plus the fact that Officer Ledford admitted that
an :inference of his and Officer Clark's activity would
be to induce a statement comes quite clearly within the
prohibition of the above cases and therefore the resulting
statements should not have been admitted.
\\Thether the police officers actually had the power
and authority to carry out their threats and promises is
not a question here. In Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
83 S. Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed. d 922 ( 1963), the Court held
that it was of no consequence if the promissor had the
power to carry out the threat or promise. so long as the
confessor believed he had the power. A police officer in
a jail would clearly come within this rule of -apparent
authority. Bram v. United States, 168 U.'S. 582, 18 S.
Ct. 183, 92 L.Ed. 568 ( 1897) .'
Appellant submits that as the statements made at
the jail were inadmissable his constitutional rights under
Jliranda have been violated regardless of the truth or
falsity of the confession or even if there is no other evidence to support the conviction. 884 U.S. at 464.

POINT III
,

't

'I

I

'

l'HE
OF ·JAMES TEA WAS IMPROPERLY .AD.M.IT'f,ED BECAUSE :·THE1.,
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PROSECUTION DID NOT DISCLOSE IN THE
BILL OF PARTICULARS THAT J
TEA
WOULD BE A 'VITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND APPELLANT WAS THEREBY PREJUDICED BY BEING UNABLE TO
PREPARE A DEFENSE AND BEING UNFAIRLY SURPRISED AT TRIAL.
The Utah Statute governing the bill of particulars
is 77-21-9, Utah Code Ann., (1953). That statute provides in part :
When an information ... charges an offense
in accordance with provisions of§ 77-21-8, but
fails to inform the defendant of the particulars
of the offense, sufficiently to enable him to
prepare his defense, ... the court ... shall at
the request of the defendant order the prosecuting attorney to furnish a bill of particulars
containing such information as may be necessary for these purposes ....
The purposes of a bill of particulars can be seen from
the above statute and from cases like T¥ yatt v. United
States, 388 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1968), where it was
held that the purposes of the bill of particulars are to
"inform the defendant of the nature of the charge
against him with sufficient precision to enable him to
prepare for trial, to avoid or minimize tlze danger of
surprise at the time of trial ... " (emphasis added).
Numerous other cases are to the same effect. See, fo1·

13
example, United States v. Leach, 427 F.2d 1107 (1st
Cir. 1970); United States v. Sullivan, 421 F.2d 676
(5th Cir. 1970). Appellant contends that he was not
able to prepare his defense to the charge adequately and
was unfairly surprised at trial. Had appellant known
that James Tea was going to testify he could have been
able to meet and challenge his testimony which was to
the effect that appellant had borrowed a shotgun shortly before the robbery in question and had returned it
shortly thereafter. (R. 91-93) Tea was not sure of the
<late, but had only been told that was the date by the
district attorney. (R. 93) Thus, appellant could have
had other evidence to show that that was not the date
he borrowed the shotgun. ·vvithout the knowledge that
Tea was going to testify appellant was unfairly surprised. In State v. lUoraine, 25 Utah2d 51, 475 P.2d
831 (1970) this court held that, 475 P.2d at 833, "all
that is required in the bill of particulars is to give information of the particulars of the crime charged so
as to enable a defendant to prepare his defense thereto." In that case the defendant had made a statement
to a hospital guard that implicated him in a crime. This
court said that the prosecution is not required to tell
the defendant what evidence will be presented to prove
the charge. However, appellant's case is necessarily distinguishable from j}[ oraine. In that case the district attorney did not know at the time the bill of particulars
was prepared of the defendant's statement to the hos-

14
pital guard; Further, there was no objection to the testimony on the basis of surprise, but it was objected to
on constitutional grounds. In appellant's case, objection
was made to, Tea's testimony before he testified, (R.
82) on the ,basis of surprise as this court indicated is
necessary in Moraine. As a result, appellant contends
that the testimony of James Tea should not have been
agmitted because appellant had no notice from the bill
of particulars that lie was to be' a witness and his testimony unfairly 11Jurprised appellant at trial.
.

'

-

,CONCLUSION

-

For tlie,reasons abo;ve stated, that appellant's statements should not have been admitted because there was
no showjng of a
waive),' of his constitutional rights
and the statements were npt ;;voluntarily and f
given, anP, that the
of James Tea unfairly
surprised appellant at trial, appellant respectfully submits :that. the cas{} should be reversed and remanded for
a new trial.
.
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